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From the Bankruptcy Courts
Alan N. Resnick*

Author's Note: For the past fifteen
years, I had written this column with
my coauthor, mentor, and dear
friend, Benjamin Weintraub. It is
with great sorrow that I inform our
readers of Mr. Weintraub's recent
death at the age of eighty-nine. His
contributions to the law since the
1930s-as lawyer, scholar, and
teacher-were truly remarkable. His
extraordinary knowledge, wit, and
good judgment will live forever in his
many published writings.

18 and Title 28 of the United States
Code.
The purpose of this article is to
provide a general summary of some
of the key provisions of the Reform
Act that should be of particular interest to secured creditors and real
estate mortgagees who are creditors
of business debtors.
Expediting Hearings on Relief
From the Automatic Stay

HOW THE BANKRUPTCY ACT OF
1994 AFFECTS SECURED
CREDITORS AND MORTGAGEES
IN BUSINESS CASES

The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1994, which was enacted on October 22, 1994, has made numerous
changes to both business and consumer bankruptcy law. With few
exceptions, these statutory changes
are applicable only in bankruptcy
cases commenced on or after the
date of enactment. The Reform Act
amended many sections of the Bankruptcy Code, as well as certain
bankruptcy-related sections of Title
*Benjamin Weintraub Distinguished
Professor of Bankruptcy Law, Hofstra University School of Law, Hempstead, N.Y.;
Counsel to the firm of Fried, Frank, Harris,
Shriver & Jacobson, New York, N.Y.;
member of the National Bankruptcy Conference.
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To avoid a problem that existed
under the former Bankruptcy Act
when courts could have delayed for
several months ruling on a motion
for relief from the automatic stay
while collateral was depreciating,
the Bankruptcy Code requires that
the court hold either a preliminary
or final hearing within thirty days
after the filing of a motion for relief
from the stay. Until the 1994
amendments, the Code provided
that-if the hearing on relief from
the stay is preliminary-the court
must commence the final hearing
within thirty days after the conclusion of the preliminary hearing.
However, the Code did not impose
a deadline for concluding the final
hearing. Thus, the bankruptcy court
could commence the final hearing
but delay conclusion of the hearing
beyond the thirty-day period.
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tors to perfect th~ir interests in order
to benefit froin the UCC's grant of
priority over certain other secured
creditors andjudiciallienors.

The 1994 Reform Act amended
Section 362(e) of the Code to. r'equire that the final hearing on the
motion for relief from the stay be
concluded within thirty days after
the conclusion of the preliminary
hearing. This period may be extended only on consent of the parties or
for a specified time that the court
finds is required by compelling circumstances.

Continued Perfection
The Reform Act amended Sections 362(b) and 546 to ~erriove any
doubt that actipns taken by a secured
creditor to continue perfection of its
security interest-such as by filing
a continuatioq statement under the
Unifotm Commercial Code2-do
not violate the automatic stay and
are effective to maintain the perfected status of the security interest.

Purchase Money Security Interest
as a Preference
Section 547(c)(3) of the Code
protects a purchase money security
interest against attack as a preference 'if the security interest is perfected within a specified time after
receipt of the goods. Until the 1994
amendments, the time period for
perfecting the security interest was
ten days. This provision was originally designed to conform to the
Uniform Commercial Code, which
gives a creditor ten days after the
debtor receives the good~ to perfect
a purchase money security interest
in order to obtain priority with respect to certain prior perfected secu..
rity interests and judicial liens. 1
An amendment to Section
547(c)(3) has changed tJ;lis t~n-day
period to twenty days. The reason
for this change is to conform, to
the current version of the Uniform
Commercial Code in most statesas amended since '1978-that provides for a twenty-day grace period
for purchase money secured credi-

Single Asset Real Estate
In response to complaints that
o~ners of real estate ~requently file
Chapter 11 petitions fo{ the purpose
of stalling foreclqsore sales without
any reasonable prospect-or even
intention-of filing a confirmable
plan of reorganizati<,m, the Reform
Act includes a provision making it
more difficult for some :of .these
cases to remain under the protection
of the Bankruptcy Code.
A new term, ':single asset real
estate,'' has been added to the (:ode
to mean real property constituting a
single property or project (other
than residential property with fewer
than four. units), which gen.erates
s,ubstanti~lly all .of the debtor's
gross income and on whic~ no substantial business is being congucted
by the debtor other than the business
of operating the real estate-but
only if the nonc~ntingent, liquidated

1
See U.C.C. Sections 9-301(2), 9312(4).

2
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See U.C.C. S~tion 9-403.

FROM THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS

secured debts do not exceed $4 million. Section 362(d) of the Code
previously included two grounds for
seeking relief from the automatic
stay. The Reform Act added a third
ground applicable only to single
asset real estate. If a mortgagee
moves for relief from the stay to
foreclose its lien on single asset real
estate, the Code now provides that
the automatic stay against the mortgagee will be limited to ninety days
after the order for relief, unless
within that time the debtor files a
Chapter 11 plan"' 'that has a reasonable possibility of being confirmed
within a reasonable time,'' or the
debtor has cpmmenced monthly
payments to every mortgagee equal
to interest at th~ market rate on the
value of the :mortgagee's interest in
the real estate. The court may extend the ninety-day period for
cause.
In view of the narrow definition
of "single asset real estate"-it
does not include property with more
than $4 · million in liens-this
amendment should not affect most
cases involving real estate. However, .in cases involving single asset
real estate, it remains to be seen
how couru, will apply monthly payments to undersecured mortgagees.
According to the Supreme Court's
deci~ion in In re Timbers of Inwo,pd
Forest, 3 undersecured mortgagees
are hot entitled to postpetition interest on their claims. Does the 1994
amendment to Section 362(d) overrule Timbers as it relates to single
3

asset real estate? Or, is it intended
that postpetition payments to mortgagees under Section 362(d)(3) be
applied to reduce the principal balance of the mortgage? An<?ther open
question is whether the new provision will influence courts to give the
debtor the full ninety-day period
in which to file a Chapter 11 plan
before granting relief from the stay.
In essence, the new provision may
benefit debtors by giving them ninety days to file a plan in situations
that may have led bankruptcy courts
in the past to grant relief much earlier in the case. It will be interesting to
see how the new Section 362(d) (3) is
applied in future court decisions.
Assignments of Rents
The Reform Act finally resplved
the issue of whether a recorded assignment of rents taken together
with a recorded real estate mortgage
is effective to give the mortgagee
a li~n on postpetition rents if the
assignment of rents was not ''perfected'' under state law by a request
for the appointment of a receiver;
sequestration, or some other enforcement step. An amendment to
Section 552 of the Code gives the
mortgagee with an assignment of
rents a security interest in postpetition rents without the need to ''perfect" under state law. The postpetition rents will constitute cash
collateral under Section 363(a) that
can be used by the debtor only with
consent or a court order providing
the mortgagee with adequate protection.

484 u.s. 365 (1988).
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It is important to note, however,
that the Reform Act amendmdnts
include two limitations on the mortgagee's rights to postpetition rents.
First, the trustee's avoiding powers
may be used to avoid the lien on
rents. Therefore, if a hypothetical
bona fide purchaser or judicial lien
creditor would have superior rights
because the assignment of rents was
not recorded prior to bankruptcy,
the trustee may avoid the lien on
rents. 4 Second, the court may order
that the security interest does not
attach to all or some of the postpetition rents on-the basis of the equities
of the case.
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fmancing by assuring protection of
liens on revenues, the Reform Act
amended Section 552(b) of the Code
so that accounts or payments for the
use or occupancy of rooms and other
public facilities in hotels, motels,
or other lodging properties will be
treated as rents. As rents, these revenues will be protected by the Code
provisions protecting cash collateral. 6 It should be noted, however,
that the court has broad 'discretion
to deprive the secured creditor of its
interest in rents on the basis of the
equities of the case. As pointed out
in the legislative history, the court
should balance the protection of secured creditors against "strong
public policies favoring continuation of jobs, preservation of going
concern values and rehabilitation of
distressed debtors. " 7 In addition,
the legislative history emphasizes
that such operating expenses as
cleaning and repair services, utilities, employee payrolls, and the like
inay be charged a'gainst hotel revenues.

Hotel Revenues
Prior to the Reform Act, a numqer of courts had treated hotel and
motel revenues as accounts receivable of the debtor's business, not as
"rents" or "proceeds" of the real
estate. 5 As a result, po~tpetition revenues have not been subject to the
lien of. a mortgagee, despite a recorded mortgage on the hotel and a
perfected security interest in rents
and profits of the hotel. In view of
the importance of encouraging hotel

Rights of Leasehold Mortgagees
Prior to the Reform Act, Section
365(h) of the Code provided that a
lessee of real property may elect to
''remain in possession of the leasehold'' if the lessor ftles a bankruptcy
petition and rejects the unexpired
lease. In recent decisions, this provision has been cohstrued narrowly
to protect only the'lessee's possess-

4

See II U.S.C. § 544(a).
See, e.g., In re General Associated
Investors Ltd. Partnership, I50 B.R. 756
(D. Ariz. I993) (revenue derived from rental
of rooms and from facilities such as fodd
and banquet rooms located in a resort were
not "rents, profits, or proceeds" within the
meaning of Section 552(b)). Compare, e.g.,
In re Days California Riverside Ltd. Partnership, 27 F3d 374 (9th Cir. 1994) (hotel
room charges in California are "rents," but
revenues derived from the sale of food and
drink and from other services provided by
the hotel are "accounts," not rents).
5

6

See 11 U.S.C. §§ 363(a), 363(c)(2).
140 Cong. Rec. H10768 (October 4,
I994).
7
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ory rights. For example, courts
have held that the lessee may not
assign its rights or enforce restrictive covenants in the lease. 8 Issues
regarding the rights of a subtenant,
leasehold mortgagee, or other party
with an interest in the leased premises have been raised but left unanswered. These issues have been of
particular interest to creditors of
lessees who rely on leasehold mortgages to secure their loans.
These concerns resulted in substantial amendments to the language
of Section 365(h). Under the
amended section, the lessee retains
its rights under the lease-to the
extent that these rights are enforceable under state law-including the
right of use, possession, quiet enjoyment, subletting, assignment, or
hypothecation. If the property is in
a shopping center, rejection of the
lease will not affect the enforceability under state law of any provision
in the lease pertaining to radius,
location, use, exclusivity, or tenant
mix or balance. Most importantly
for leasehold mortgagees, the
amendments protect certain other
parties by including within the
meaning of" lessee" any successor,
assignee, or mortgagee permitted
under the terms of the lease.
8 See, e.g., In re Carlton Restaurant,
Inc., 151 B.R. 353 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1993)
(preventing a tenant from assigning the
lease); Home Express, Inc. v. Arden Associates, Ltd., 152 B.R. 971 (Bankr. E. D. Cal.
1993) (tenant could not enforce restrictive
covenants).

Real Estate Taxes
In cases filed before the enactment of the 1994 Reform Act, the
automatic stay prevents the attachment of a statutory lien on the property of the estate with respect to
taxes accruing after the commencement of a bankruptcy case. Municipalities have expressed concern that
the automatic stay impairs their revenue collecting capability while creating a windfall to mortgagees who
would otherwise be subordinate to
such tax liens. In response to this
concern, Congress included in the
Reform Act a new exception to the
automatic stay in Section 362(b) for
''the creation or perfection of a statutory lien for an ad valorem property tax imposed by the District of
Columbia, or a political subdivision
of a State, if such tax becomes due
after the filing of the petition. " 9
Curing Defaults
Chapter 11 plans frequently provide for the curing of defaults and
the reinstatement of the original
terms regarding a debt or bond issuance. By curing defaults and putting
the obligation back on its original
track, the plan leaves the creditor
unimpaired under Section 1124(2).
The Reform Act amended the Code
to provide that-if a Chapter 11
plan proposes to cure a default-the
amount necessary to cure the default
is determined in accordance with
the underlying agreement and applicable nonbankruptcy law. This
9

95

11 U .S.C. § 362(b)(18).
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amendment is unusual because it
applies prospectively only. That is,
any agreemen.t mad~ prior to the
date of enactment is not affected by
this change even if the bankruptcy
petition is filed after the enactment
of the 1994 Reform Act.
The amendment, whic~ is contained in Section 1123, is substantially t:Pe same as other amendments
made in Chapte~ 12 and .Chapter
13. These changes appear to uphold
default interest rate clauses to the
extent that they are enforceable under state law. The legislative history
indicates that the purpose of these
amendments is to prevent windfalls
for secured creditors as a result of
the Supreme Court decision in Rake
v. Wtlde, 10 where the 'Court required
a Chapter 13 debtor to pay interest
on interest and interest on late
charges to, cure a default on a home
mortgage even though state law prohibited such interest and the agreement did not provide for it.
'1

'

Debtor's Right to Return Goods
An amendment tQ Section 546 of
the Code gives the trustee or aebtor
in possession~with consent of the
vendor and if the court finds after
notice and a hearing that it is in the
best interests of the estate-the right
to return goods shipped to the debtor
prepetition. The' vendor then offsets
the price of the goods against its
prepetition claim. An order authorizing the return of goods may be
issued only if the trustee. or·.debtor
files a motion seeking such authori10

[VOL. 28 : 911995]

zation within 120 days aft~r the order for relief. Under the Code before this (\lllendment\ the return of
goods to a vendor would be aq i]I\permissiple payment oLa prepetiti~n claill} vnless the vendor has the
right of reclamation.
An issue raised but unanswered
by this amendment is ho~ the return
of goods under this section affects
the rights of prepetition and postpetition lenders with security interests
in the debtor's inventory. Once
goods are delivered fo the debtor
before bankruptcy' a security interest in the debtor's inventory would
attach to those goods. Such goods
also may.becom&the collateral that
secures postpetition finanfing. 11 If
the goops are subsequently returned
to the vendor under the new provision, does the security interest remain wit\1 the goods? Or, is the ne":
prm;ision another avoiding power
that permits the trustee to avoid prepetition or P.Ostpetition security interests in inventory by returning
them for a full credit? Unfortunately, it will ·~e 'future litigatio.n
to determine the answers to these
questions.
Aircraft Equipment, Vessels, and
Rolling Stock Equipment
Sections 1110 and 1168 of the
Code provide special protection for
certain secured creditors, conditional vendors, and lessors with interests in aircraft, certain aircraft
equipment, vessels, or railroad rolling stock equipment. The Reform
11

113 S. Ct. 2187 (1993).
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See 11 U.S.C. §§ 364(c) and 364(d).
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Act clarified and expanded these.
sections to provide that the rights
of the secured creditor, conditional
vendor, or lessor to take possession
of such equipment may not be affected by the automatic stay, confirmation of a plan, the debtor's right
to use property, or the injunctive
pow~rs of the court, unless the trustee cures defaults within certain time
limits a~d. within sixty days afte~
the 'order for relief, agrees to perform all obligaP,ons of the debtor.
13efore the R~form Act, the Cod~
provided that creditors wiih security
interests in such equipment were
protected by Sections 1110 and
1168 only if they have purchase
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money security interests. The 1994
amendments expahdeo these sections to provide the same pt:otection
for all lease fmancing arrangement!t
and all secured financing-not only
purchase money financing-if the
equipment is first placed in service
after October 22, 1994. Ih addition,
under a new definition o( "lease"
contained in these sections, equipment placed in service befo.,re ,the
date of enactment receJves Section
1110 or 1168 protection if tl}e lessor
and the debtor have expressed in the
lease or a contemporaneous writing
that the agreement is to be treated
as a lease for federal income tax
purposes.

